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Abstract 
Previous studies have shown that while people can rapidly and accurately compute their own and 
other people’s visual perspectives, they experience difficulty ignoring the irrelevant perspective 
when the two perspectives differ. We used the ‘avatar’ perspective-taking task to examine the 
mechanisms that underlie these egocentric (i.e. interference from their own perspective) and 
altercentric (i.e. interference from the other person’s perspective) tendencies. Participants were 
eye-tracked as they verified the number of discs in a visual scene according to either their own or 
an on-screen avatar’s perspective. Crucially in some trials the two perspectives were inconsistent 
(i.e. each saw a different number of discs), while in others they were consistent. To examine the 
effect of perspective switching, performance was compared for trials that were preceded with the 
same versus different perspective cue. We found that altercentric interference can be reduced or 
eliminated when participants stick with their own perspective across consecutive trials. Our eye-
tracking analyses revealed distinct fixation patterns for self and other perspective-taking, 
suggesting that consistency effects in this paradigm are driven by implicit mentalising of what 
others can see, and not automatic directional cues from the avatar. 
  
Keywords: Theory of Mind, visual perspective taking, perspective switching, self/other, eye-
tracking.  
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Introduction 
Visual perspective-taking is commonly seen as a key component of people’s ability to understand 
the mental states of others (their meaning, intentions, desires and knowledge), which is often 
described as Theory of Mind (ToM), mentalising, or mindreading. Visual perspective-taking is 
typically examined along one of two dimensions; one that simply assesses what someone else can 
see (termed ‘level 1’ perspective-taking), and another that requires participants to adopt someone 
else’s spatial point of view to judge how that person sees a particular visual stimulus (termed 
‘level 2’ perspective-taking). These two types of visual perspective-taking can be differentiated 
according whether or not they require one to mentally rotate into the position of the other person 
(Michelon & Zacks, 2006; Surtees, Apperly, & Samson, 2013). The current study focuses on 
level 1 visual perspective-taking, examining the cognitive mechanisms that underlie judgments 
about ‘self’ and ‘other’ perspectives. 
Research investigating level 1 visual perspective-taking has frequently employed a task in 
which participants are presented with images of a 3D room, and have to verify the number of 
discs in that visual scene according to either their own or an on-screen avatar’s perspective. 
Crucially, in some of the trials the two perspectives are inconsistent (i.e. each sees a different 
number of discs), while in others they are consistent. In the first study of this kind, Samson, 
Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, and Scott (2010) found that healthy adults can rapidly and 
accurately compute other people’s visual perspectives, or respond according to their own broader 
viewpoint (which may include objects that are hidden form the avatar’s view). Nevertheless, 
participants experienced difficulty ignoring the irrelevant perspective (i.e. either what they saw or 
what the avatar saw) when the two perspectives differed; performance on the task was influenced 
by both egocentric and altercentric tendencies. That is, participants’ responses were slower and 
less accurate when judging what the avatar could see required them to inhibit their own visual 
perspective, and when judging what they could see required them to inhibit the avatar’s visual 
perspective.  
		 5 
An egocentric or reality bias (Mitchell, Robinson, Isaacs, & Nye, 1996) has been 
frequently documented in the ToM literature- even among healthy adults- and can have the effect 
of delaying or even cancelling perspective-taking all together (e.g. Barr & Keysar, 2002; Birch & 
Bloom, 2007; Dumontheil, Küster, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010; Epley, Morewedge & Keysar, 
2004; Keysar, & Barr, 2005; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003). 
Indeed, some researchers have proposed that perspective-taking is initially biased to one’s own 
knowledge, and that integration of other peoples’ perspectives operates only as a subsequent and 
controlled correction mechanism (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004). Evidence of 
altercentric intrusions is more limited, and has so far been found only in tasks that tap visual 
perspective-taking (Capozzi, Cavallo, Furlanetto, & Becchio, 2014; Furlanetto, Becchio, Samson, 
& Apperly, 2016; Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010; Nielsen, Slade, Levy, & Holmes, 2015; 
Ramsey, Hanson, Apperly, Samson, 2013; Samson et al., 2010; Surtees & Apperly, 2012; 
Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson, 2010). These studies clearly show that observers can rapidly and 
involuntarily compute other people’s visual perspectives, though recent research has shown that 
this spontaneous ‘other’ perspective-tracking is impaired when observers must track multiple 
discrepant viewpoints (Capozzi et al., 2014). 
Taken together, this research shows that perspective-taking can occur automatically, and 
can be rapidly integrated into subsequent processing. However, there are also good reasons for 
thinking that adopting someone else’s perspective is more cognitively effortful than simply 
referring to the self-perspective (Apperly et al., 2009, 2010; Birch & Bloom, 2007). For example, 
studies that have applied working memory load manipulations have shown that higher cognitive 
load impedes one’s ability to infer other peoples’ mental states (Bull, Phillips, & Conway, 2008; 
Cane, Ferguson, & Apperly, submitted; Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 
2007; Schneider, Lam, Bayliss, & Dux, 2012), and recent research has shown that individual 
differences in executive function predicts perspective-taking ability in complex tasks (Bradford, 
Jentzsch, & Gomez, 2015; Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Grodner, Dalini, Pearlstein-Levy, & Ward, 
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2012; Lin et al., 2010). Interestingly, ability to compute level-1 visual perspectives is not 
disrupted by a simultaneous load on executive function (Qureshi et al., 2010). This suggests that 
inferring other peoples’ visual perspectives may tap into an automatic, more cognitively efficient 
system than other more complex ToM processes, such as belief reasoning and inferences from 
language, which rely on a more flexible but cognitively demanding system (Apperly & Butterfill, 
2009).  
The current study adapted Samson et al’s (2010) ‘avatar’ visual perspective-taking task, 
and set out to address two main aims. First, we aimed to use eye-tracking to examine the 
cognitive mechanisms that underlie visual perspective-taking. Eye-tracking has been applied to 
this visual perspective-taking paradigm once before (Nielsen et al., 2015), but with a fairly 
rudimentary measure of gaze duration collapsed across a large area of interest that included the 
avatar and areas in front and behind the avatar (including the discs). This study showed that gaze 
durations were elevated when the self and other perspectives were inconsistent, thus reflecting 
both egocentric and altercentric interference. The social basis of this altercentric effect was 
further supported by a correlation with self-reported perspective-taking ability and empathy that 
was not present in conditions where the avatar was replaced with a semisocial (an arrow) or 
nonsocial (a dual-coloured block) central stimulus. Our study employs much finer grained 
analyses of visual attention. Specifically, we recorded the number and location of participants’ 
fixations in the level 1 visual perspective-taking task to compare how people allocate their visual 
attention between the avatar’s gaze location and the wall behind the avatar’s gaze (the ‘no-gaze’ 
location), and how this differs when they have been prompted to take the self or other 
perspective. Though no previous studies have examined these visual biases in the visual 
perspective-taking task, related research has demonstrated that gaze direction provides a strong 
attentional cue in guiding eye movements toward the location of an actor's gaze (Borji, Parks, & 
Itti, 2014; Castelhano, Wieth, & Henderson, 2007). Crucially, this methodology should also 
provide a means of disentangling traditional mentalising accounts for spontaneous visual 
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perspective-taking from directional (or sub-mentalising) accounts, which suggest that attention is 
driven by domain-general processes based on directional features of the avatar (Heyes, 2014; 
Santiesteban, Catmur, Hopkins, Bird, & Heyes, 2014). Specifically, Santiesteban et al. (2014) 
found a comparable reaction time difference between consistent and inconsistent trials when the 
central avatar was replaced with an arrow (but see Schurz, Kronbichler, Weissengruber, Surtees, 
Samson, & Perner, 2015 and Nielsen et al., 2015). Since arrows provide directional, but not 
agentive, cues the authors interpret this as evidence against an implicit mentalising account of the 
altercentric effect, and instead supports the role of attentional processes. Here, we use eye-
tracking to examine how visual attention is directed around the scenes during the visual 
perspective-taking task, specifically examining the location of the first fixation in each scene. The 
directional account would predict that early visual attention automatically shifts to the dots in the 
avatar’s field of view regardless of the perspective cue condition. In contrast, if the consistency 
effect is driven by implicit mentalising of what the avatar can see, we would expect to see 
modulation of the gaze location bias depending on whether participants were cued to take their 
own/the avatar’s visual perspective. Therefore, we tested the implicit mentalising prediction that 
participants would show a reduced bias to fixate the avatar’s gaze location when they adopted 
their own perspective compared to when they took the avatar’s, as participants should divide their 
attention between the two possible locations (i.e. the gaze location and no-gaze location).  
The second aim in our study was to test how switching between self and other 
perspectives across consecutive trials influences performance on a level 1 visual perspective-
taking task. Neuroimaging research has demonstrated that mental state attributions about the self 
and others engage distinct brain mechanisms (e.g. Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Jeannerod & 
Anquetil, 2008; Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan, & Humphreys, 2005; Saxe, Moran, Scholz, 
& Gabrieli, 2006; Vogeley et al., 2001), as well as specific regions that respond to conflicts 
between self and other states (e.g. McCleery, Surtees, Graham, Richards, & Apperly, 2011). 
Thus, switching between self and other perspectives is likely to require disengagement of one 
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perspective to adopt the other. Nevertheless, rapidly switching between self and other 
perspectives depending on context is one of the key processing steps involved in successful 
everyday social cognition; children’s development of ToM correlates with their cognitive 
flexibility (Hughes, 1998). Samson et al. (2010) examined perspective shifting indirectly in their 
paper by comparing performance across their experiments, which varied whether perspective 
shifting between self and other viewpoints was manipulated within (Experiment 1) or between 
blocks (Experiment 2), and when no shift of perspective was required (participants only attended 
to their own perspective throughout the task, Experiment 3). Results showed that egocentric and 
altercentric biases were present regardless of whether participants had to shift between 
perspectives within a block or not, though self-perspective judgments were faster when 
repeatedly judging one’s own perspective. This supports the idea that intrusions from an 
irrelevant visual perspective occur automatically, but suggests that this interference may be 
greater when one needs to switch between the self and other perspective. Similarly, a recent study 
that manipulated self/other perspectives in a variant false belief task found that participants 
responded faster according to the self than other perspective, but only when a perspective shift 
had occurred within the narrative (Bradford, Jentzsch, & Gomez, 2015). Together these findings 
support a dissociation between self and other attributions, and suggest that switching perspectives 
is cognitively effortful. In the current study, we compared performance between consecutive 
trials that tapped the same perspective (i.e. (you-) YOU or (they-) THEY; referred to as ‘stick’ 
trials here) and trials that tapped different perspectives (i.e. (you-) THEY or (they-) YOU; referred 
to as ‘switch’ trials here).  
In sum, the current study examined level 1 visual perspective-taking, and manipulated 
three key variables: whose visual perspective to take on a trial (self vs. other), the consistency of 
visual perspective between the participant and avatar (consistent vs. inconsistent), and the 
presence or absence of a perspective switch between consecutive trials (switch vs. stick). We 
recorded participants’ response accuracy, reaction times and eye movements as a measure of their 
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egocentric (i.e. interference from their own perspective) and altercentric (i.e. interference from 
the other person’s perspective) tendencies. Behaviourally, we expected to replicate the pattern of 
effects found by Samson et al. (2010), with higher error rates and slower response times when the 
two perspectives differed. In addition, we predicted that switching perspectives between trials 
would lead to increased error rates and response times compared to when the perspective cues on 
two consecutive trials were the same. Moreover, we expected egocentric and altercentric 
interference to increase when participants had to switch perspectives across consecutive trials, 
due to difficulty disengaging from the previously activated perspective. It is also possible that 
interference would be reduced or eliminated on stick trials when no perspective switch is 
necessary. Analyses of eye movements were used to uncover the distinct processing strategies 
that underlie these effects (i.e. implicit mentalising versus directional account). 
 
Method 
Participants  
A total of 26 participants from the University of Kent took part in the study. Two participants 
were removed due to poor overall accuracy on the task (<50% accuracy); all other participants 
achieved at least 95% accuracy. Therefore, the final sample included 24 participants (20 females; 
Mage = 19.04, SDage = 1.17).  
 
Materials 
Participants took part in an eye-tracked version of the visual perspective-taking task (Samson et 
al., 2010), which will be described in full below. Visual stimuli included a picture of a room in 
3D lateral view, where the left, back and right walls were visible. Red discs were displayed on 
one or two of the left/right walls. The number and position of discs changed on each trial. In 
addition, a male or female human avatar was standing in the centre of the room, facing either the 
left or right wall (an even split of trials facing each direction). On half the trials, the avatar’s 
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orientation meant that s/he saw the same number of discs as the participant (consistent condition), 
and on the other half, the avatar’s orientation meant that s/he could not see some of the discs that 
were visible to the participant (since they were placed on the wall behind the avatar; inconsistent 
condition). See Figure 1 for examples of these visual stimuli. The avatar’s gender always 
matched the participant’s gender. Participants’ task was to verify the number of discs that were 
visible either according to their own perspective (self perspective condition), or according to the 
avatar’s perspective (other perspective condition). 
 
Procedure  
Participants were seated at a distance of 60cm (fixed by a chin-rest) in front of a 20.5 inch colour 
monitor in 1024 x 768 resolution, and gaze locations and movements from the right eye were 
recorded using an EyeLink 1000 eye-tracker running at 1000Hz (viewing was binocular). The 
experiment was controlled using Experiment Builder software and the experimental procedure is 
illustrated in Figure 1. Each trial began with a drift correction procedure, which was followed by 
a fixation cross in the centre of the screen for 750ms. The word “YOU” or “SHE/ HE” appeared 
500ms later, and was presented for 750ms. This informed participants whether to respond to the 
current trial according to their own or the avatar’s perspective. Following a blank screen lasting 
500ms, a digit between 0 and 3 was shown in the centre of the screen for 750ms. This indicated 
the number of discs the participant needed to verify, according to the given perspective. Finally, 
the target image of the room, avatar and discs (650 x 480 pixels) appeared centrally on-screen. 
Thus, the target image subtended 24.5 x 18 degrees of visual angle, which extends beyond the 
central foveal window (5°), and should encourage participants to move their eyes to verify discs 
on each side of the room. Participants were instructed to select whether the number of discs in the 
target image matched the preceding digit according to the cued perspective, using keys “z” as yes 
and “m” as no (key associations were counterbalanced across participants). Participants were 
asked to respond as quickly and accurately as possible, and had a maximum of 2000ms to answer 
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before the task moved to the next trial (see Figure 1). The screen advanced to the next trial once a 
keyboard response had been detected. 
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic trial sequence of visual displays presented to participants in the visual 
perspective-taking task. 
 
Trials could either be matching or mismatching. On matching trials the specified digit 
correctly corresponded to the number of discs that could be seen from the stated perspective in 
the target image. On mismatching trials the specified digit did not correctly correspond to the 
number of discs that could be seen from the stated perspective. Following Samson et al.’s (2010) 
procedure, and because mismatching trials require different processing, only matching trials were 
analysed.  
Participants completed a practice block of 26 trials, followed by the main task, which 
consisted of four blocks, each with 52 trials. In total there were 96 matching trials, 96 
1"YOU"+"
2"SHE"+"
750ms" 500ms" 750ms" 500ms" 750ms" 2000ms"
Self%Consistent%
Self%Inconsistent%
Other%Consistent%
Other%Inconsistent%
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mismatching trials and 16 ‘filler’ trials (where no discs were displayed on either wall so that the 
disc number 0 was sometimes correct for self perspective trials). Participants were asked to 
respond according to their own perspective on 48 matching trials, and to respond according to the 
avatar’s perspective on the other 48 matching trials. Of these, exactly half were consistent trials, 
where the avatar and participant’s visual perspectives were the same, and half were inconsistent 
trials, where the avatar and participant’s visual perspectives were different. Trials were presented 
in a fixed pseudo-random order so that half the time, self and other perspective trials were 
preceded by a trial that tapped the same perspective (‘stick’ trial type) and half the time self and 
other perspective trials were preceded by a different perspective trial, thus requiring participants 
to switch perspectives between trials (‘switch’ trial type). Half of each trial type (stick/switch) 
included an avatar that faced the same direction as the preceding trial, and the other half included 
an avatar that faced a different direction as the preceding trial. Overall, trials were equally likely 
to have been preceded by a same perspective trial as a different perspective trial. The maximum 
number of consecutive trials that tapped the same perspective was four, and there were no more 
than three consecutive trials of the same perspective-consistency condition. No complete stimulus 
repetitions (i.e. same perspective cue and image) were included.  
At the beginning of the experiment, and once every 26 trials thereafter, the eye-tracker 
was calibrated and validated against nine fixation points, using the standard EyeLink calibration 
procedure. This procedure took about half a minute and the entire main experiment lasted for 
about 25 minutes. 
In sum, the main experiment observed the effects of three independent variables, in a 
2(trial type: stick vs. switch) x 2(consistency: consistent vs. inconsistent) x 2(perspective: self vs. 
other) repeated-measures design. Effects were analysed on four dependent variables: accuracy of 
responses, response time, number of fixations, and the location of the first fixation.  
 
Results 
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Behavioural Data Preparation  
Behavioural analyses focused on participants’ accuracy and response times when verifying the 
target image against the given perspective and number of discs. As in Samson et al. (2010) and 
Qureshi et al. (2010), only matching trials were included in the statistical analyses; mismatching 
trials, where the correct answer was “no” due to the target image not matching the specified 
number of discs, were eliminated prior to analysis. Incorrect picture verification responses and 
trials where the participant did not respond to the image in the given 2000ms were excluded from 
the response time analysis (5.54%), which was measured from the onset of the picture.  
Accuracy and reaction time data were analysed using separate 2x2x2 analyses of variance 
(ANOVA), with trial type (switch vs. stick), perspective (self vs. other), and consistency 
(consistent vs. inconsistent) as the within-subjects variables. Bonferonni adjustments were used to 
correct for multiple comparisons when necessary. 
 
Response Accuracy   
Mean accuracy in each condition is shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: Mean accuracy for each experimental condition. Errors bars show standard errors. 
 
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of consistency, F(1, 23) = 13.32, p < .001, pη² = 
.37, reflecting higher accuracy when participants shared the same visual perspective with the 
avatar (M = 97%), compared to when the two perspectives were inconsistent (M = 93%). In 
addition, consistency interacted significantly with perspective, F(1, 23) = 4.46, p < .05, pη² = .16. 
Follow-up analyses with paired t-tests revealed a significant egocentric intrusion effect, with 
significantly reduced accuracy on inconsistent versus consistent trials when taking the avatar’s 
perspective, t(23) = 4.44, p < .001, but no altercentric intrusion effect when taking the self 
perspective, t < 1. Neither the main effect of perspective or trial type, or the remaining 
interactions were significant, Fs < 1.  
 
Response Times  
Figure 3 presents the mean response times for each condition.  
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Figure 3: Mean response time for each experimental condition. Errors bars show standard errors. 
 
The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of consistency, F(1, 23) = 21.89, p < .001, 
pη² = .49, with responses being slower when perspectives were inconsistent (M = 859ms) 
compared to when perspectives were consistent (M = 784ms). There was also a main effect of 
trial type, F(1, 23) = 51.51, p < .001, pη² = .69, which reflected faster overall responses when the 
previous trial probed the same perspective as the current trial (i.e. stick, M = 791ms), compared 
to when participants had to switch perspective between the previous and current trial (M = 
851ms). Trial type also interacted with consistency, F(1, 23) = 21.96, p < .001, pη² = .49, and as 
part of a three-way interaction between perspective*consistency*trial type, F(1, 23) = 27.39, p < 
.001, pη² = .54. None of the remaining main effects or interactions were significant, Fs < 2.3. 
The three-way interaction was examined by running separate ANOVAs for each trial 
type. When the previous trial probed the same perspective as the current trial (i.e. stick trials), the 
perspective*consistency interaction was significant, F(1, 23) = 17.38, p < .001, pη² = .43. Paired-
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sample t-tests revealed egocentric interference when participants judged the avatar’s perspective, 
t(23) = 3.45, p < .005, with slower responses on inconsistent (M = 833ms) than consistent trials 
(M = 760ms), but no altercentric interference when participants judged their own perspective, t < 
1.3. In contrast, when participants had to switch perspective from the previous trial the significant 
perspective*consistency interaction, F(1, 23) = 7.17, p < .01, pη² = .24, reflected both egocentric 
and altercentric interference (inconsistent > consistent in both perspective conditions; other, t(23) 
= 3.44, p < .005; self, t(23) = 5.91, p < .001), though here the altercentric intrusion effect (946ms 
vs. 782ms) was larger than the egocentric intrusion effect (881ms vs. 796ms).  
 
Eye Movement Analysis 
First, we visualized fixations around the scenes by fitting a Gaussian distribution to all fixations 
for each trial to determine the onscreen distribution of these fixations for each of the experimental 
conditions (for similar analyses see, e.g., Bindemann, 2010; Bindemann, Scheepers, Ferguson, & 
Burton, 2010). To correct for avatar gaze direction (i.e. avatar could face left or right) all images 
were flipped so that the avatar faced left, and fixation locations were adjusted accordingly on the 
horizontal axis. The resulting distributions were converted to z-scores and are displayed as 
‘heatmaps’ in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4: Distribution of all fixations around the scene for each experimental condition. 
Inconsistent-1 refers to trials where discs were only visible on the wall behind the avatar and 
Inconsistent-2 refers to trials where discs were visible on both walls. Error bars show standard 
errors. 
 
Note that on consistent trials the wall behind the avatar never contained any discs, and on 
half of the inconsistent trials the wall facing the avatar never contained any discs (see Figure 1). 
The absence of discs on one wall meant that participants had no reason to fixate that location, and 
thus gaze was biased to the areas containing visual input on these trials, as seen in the fixation 
distributions in Figure 4. In contrast, on half the inconsistent trials discs were visible on both 
walls, meaning that the gaze/no-gaze locations contained an equal number of discs across trials 
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and therefore were not affected by low-level visual biases. Due to these inherent visual biases 
across stimuli and hence fixation distributions, eye movement were analysed in two ways. First, 
analyses compared consistent trials where discs were only visible on the wall in front of the 
avatar (i.e. in front 1, behind 0; in front 2, behind 0; in front 3, behind 0) with inconsistent trials 
where discs were only visible on the wall behind the avatar (i.e. in front 0, behind 1; in front 0, 
behind 2; in front 0, behind 3). Then inconsistent trials where discs were visible on both walls 
(i.e. in front 1, behind 1; in front 1, behind 2; in front 2, behind 1) were examined in a separate 
analysis.  
ANOVAs that compared consistent and inconsistent trials (where discs were only visible 
on the ‘no gaze’ wall) crossed trial type (switch vs. stick), perspective (self vs. other), and 
consistency (consistent vs. inconsistent) as the within-subjects variables. ANOVAs on 
inconsistent trials where discs were visible on both walls crossed trial type (switch vs. stick), 
perspective (self vs. other) as the within-subjects variables. Bonferonni adjustments were used to 
correct for multiple comparisons when necessary. 
 
Number of Fixations First we examined the number of fixations that participants made around 
the scene during the decision period from target image onset until a keyboard response had been 
made. The mean number of fixations per trial for each condition is shown in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5: Mean number of fixations in each condition. Inconsistent-1 refers to trials where discs 
were only visible on the wall behind the avatar and Inconsistent-2 refers to trials where discs 
were visible on both walls. Error bars show standard errors. 
 
The ANOVA comparing consistent and inconsistent trials (where discs were only visible 
on the ‘no gaze’ wall) showed a significant main effect of trial type, F(1, 23) = 17.45, p < .001, 
pη² = .43, with more fixations being made around the scene when participants had to switch 
perspective between the previous and current trial (M = 2.19), compared to when the previous 
trial probed the same perspective as the current trial (i.e. stick, M = 1.95). In addition, consistency 
interacted with trial type, F(1, 23) = 10.55, p < .005, pη² = .31, perspective, F(1, 23) = 5.86, p < 
.05, pη² = .2, and as part of a three-way interaction between trial type*perspective*consistency, 
F(1, 23) = 7.31, p < .01, pη² = .24. The three-way interaction was examined by running separate 
ANOVAs for each trial type. These revealed no significant effects on stick trials (all Fs < 3), but 
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a main effect of consistency (consistent < inconsistent), F(1, 23) = 4.37, p < .05, pη² = .16, and a 
significant perspective*consistency interaction, F(1, 23) = 9.91, p < .005, pη² = .3, on switch 
trials. Paired-sample t-tests showed that participants only made more fixations on inconsistent 
versus consistent trials when responding according to their own perspective, t(23) = 4.05, p < 
.001, but not when taking the avatar’s perspective, t < .9.  
The ANOVA on inconsistent trials where discs were visible on both walls showed a 
significant trial type*perspective interaction, F(1, 23) = 5.23, p < .05, pη² = .19. Paired-sample t-
tests showed that participants made more fixations on switch versus stick trials when responding 
according to their own perspective, t(23) = 2.52, p < .05, but no difference when taking the 
avatar’s perspective, t < .6. They also made more fixations when taking the avatar’s perspective 
than the self perspective on stick trials, t(23) = 2.33, p < .05, but no difference when a perspective 
switch was required between trials, t < 1.1. 
 
First Fixation Location We examined the location of the first fixation following image 
onset since this provides the most accurate measure of automatic processes1. Eye movements 
were processed by mapping the spatial coordinates, in pixels, of fixations onto appropriate 
regions of analysis. These regions of analysis corresponded to the two sides of the room 
(excluding the avatar in the centre), that is the area in front of the avatar’s gaze (referred to here 
as the ‘gaze location’) and the area behind the avatar’s gaze (‘no-gaze location’) for each image. 
If a fixation was located within either of these two areas, it was coded as belonging to that 
gaze/no-gaze location, otherwise it was coded as background.  
Visual preferences between the gaze and no-gaze locations were examined for each 
                                                      
1	Participants’ starting fixation (i.e. at the point of image onset) was discarded since this was 
always on the avatar in the centre of the screen (due to the centrally-located number on the 
preceding screen).	
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condition by calculating a gaze location bias score (i.e. the probability of first fixating the gaze 
location minus the probability of first fixating the no-gaze location). This measure is symmetrical 
around zero such that higher proportions of fixations on the gaze location result in a positive 
score, whereas higher proportions of fixations on the no-gaze location result in a negative score. 
The maximum score in either direction is therefore 1 or -1. Statistical analyses were carried out 
on this gaze location bias score. Figure 5 displays the mean bias scores for each experimental 
condition. 
 
 
Figure 6: Mean probability of fixating either the gaze location (reflected in a positive value) or 
no-gaze location (reflected in a negative value) in each condition. Inconsistent-1 refers to trials 
where discs were only visible on the wall behind the avatar and Inconsistent-2 refers to trials 
where discs were visible on both walls. Error bars show standard errors. 
 
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Self Other Self Other
Stick Switch
Ga
ze
	Lo
ca
tio
n	
Bi
as
Consistent
Inconsistent-1
Inconsistent-2
		 22 
The ANOVA comparing consistent and inconsistent trials (where discs were only visible 
on the ‘no gaze’ wall) showed a significant main effect of consistency, F(1, 23) = 422.83, p < 
.001, pη² = .95, reflecting a bias to fixate the gaze location when the participant and avatar’s 
perspectives were consistent (M = .63; 1-sample t-test to zero, t(23) = 20.48, p < .001), but a 
weaker bias to fixate the no-gaze location when the participant and avatar’s perspectives were 
inconsistent (M = -.37; 1-sample t-test to zero, t(23) = -10.95, p < .001). The main effect of 
perspective was also significant, F(1, 23) = 28.78, p < .001, pη² = .56, showing a bias to fixate the 
gaze location when participants were taking the avatar’s perspective (M = .23; 1-sample t-test to 
zero, t(23) = 7.13, p < .001), but no significant bias to either the gaze or no-gaze location when 
responding according to their own perspective (M = .04; 1-sample t-test to zero, t<1.6). In 
addition, the interaction between consistency and perspective was significant, F(1, 23) = 36.83, p 
< .001, pη² = .62. Paired-sample t-tests showed that while the consistency effect was significant 
for both ‘you’ and ‘they’ trials, it was larger when participants were responding according to their 
own perspective, t(23) = 18.19, p < .001, than when taking the avatar’s perspective, t(23) = 12.19, 
p < .001. Moreover, the perspective effect was significant for both consistent and inconsistent 
trials, but reflected a reduced gaze location bias for other than self perspective trials when the 
participant and avatar’s perspectives were inconsistent, t(23) = 6.07, p < .001, but the opposite 
pattern (other < self) when the participant and avatar’s perspectives were consistent, t(23) = 2.69, 
p < .05. None of the remaining effects reached significance, Fs < 2.4. 
The ANOVA on inconsistent trials where discs were visible on both walls showed a main 
effect of perspective, F(1, 23) = 24.49, p < .001, pη² = .52, with a strong gaze location bias when 
participants were responding according to the avatar’s perspective (M = .36; 1-sample t-test to 
zero, t(23) = 8.22, p < .001), but no bias to either the gaze or no-gaze location when taking their 
own perspective (M = .06; 1-sample t-test to zero, t<1.3). In addition, the main effect of trial type 
was significant, F(1, 23) = 18.93, p < .001, pη² = .45, reflecting a bias to the gaze location on 
stick trials (M = .34; 1-sample t-test to zero, t(23) = 8.43, p < .001) but no bias to either location 
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on switch trials (M = .08; 1-sample t-test to zero, t<1.7). The trial type*perspective interaction 
was not significant, F < 1. 
 
Discussion 
In this paper we used eye-tracking to examine the cognitive mechanisms that underlie 
performance on a level 1 visual perspective-taking task, and sought to investigate how switching 
between self and other perspectives influences this ability. Participants completed a version of 
Samson et al’s (2010) dot-probe visual perspective-taking task. They were presented with images 
of a 3D room, and had to verify the number of discs in that visual scene according to either their 
own or an on-screen avatar’s visual perspective. Crucially, in some of the trials the two 
perspectives were inconsistent (i.e. each saw a different number of discs), while in others they 
were consistent. To examine the influence of perspective switching, the order of trials was 
pseudorandomised such that half the trials were preceded by a trial with the same perspective cue 
(i.e. (you-) YOU or (they-) THEY; referred to as ‘stick’ trials here) and half the trials were 
preceded by a trial with a different perspective cue (i.e. (you-) THEY or (they-) YOU; referred to 
as ‘switch’ trials here). Participants’ behavioural responses on the task (i.e. response accuracy 
and reaction times) were complemented by analyses of eye movements that examined the number 
and location of fixations (the avatar’s gaze location versus the wall behind the avatar’s gaze) in 
each condition. 
 Behavioural results largely replicated previous studies of this kind (Samson et al., 2010; 
Surtees & Apperly, 2012; Qureshi et al., 2010; Nielsen et al., 2015), showing higher accuracy and 
faster response times when participants shared the same visual perspective as the on-screen 
avatar, compared to when the two perspectives were different. However in our study the reduced 
accuracy on inconsistent versus consistent trials was only significant when participants were 
prompted to take the avatar’s perspective, and not when taking the self perspective. Thus in line 
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with previous studies, our participants experienced both egocentric (i.e. interference from their 
own perspective) and altercentric (i.e. interference from the avatar’s perspective) intrusions 
during perspective-taking, though the effect of the egocentric bias was greater than the 
altercentric bias. 
Interestingly, while perspective switching did not influence accuracy it did modulate the 
speed of responses, with participants responding slower overall when the previous and current 
trials tapped different visual perspectives compared to when no perspective switch was required. 
Analysis of the number of fixations corroborated this pattern by showing more fixations on 
switch trials compared to stick trials, suggesting that a broader visual search underlies the 
increased reaction times on switch trials. Moreover, while egocentric intrusions were apparent on 
both stick and switch trial types, altercentric interference appeared to be eliminated when 
participants stuck with their own perspective across consecutive trials. This suggests that 
inferences based on the other perspective might be weaker when consistently focusing on one’s 
own perspective, which leads to reduced interference between self and other states. In contrast, 
altercentric interference was significantly increased when participants had to switch from the 
other to self perspective between trials, suggesting that recent activation of the avatar’s 
perspective enhanced the saliency of the other perspective, leading to increased conflict between 
self and other states. This pattern was also reflected on the number of fixations measure, where 
an altercentric effect was indicated by more fixations on inconsistent versus consistent trials, only 
on switch trials, and not on stick trials. That the altercentric intrusion effect was modulated by 
perspective switching supports previous neuroimaging and patient studies in showing that distinct 
cognitive mechanisms underlie attributions about the self and others (e.g. Decety & Sommerville, 
2003; Jeannerod & Anquetil, 2008; Samson et al., 2005; Saxe et al., 2006; Vogeley et al., 2001). 
Further, the fact egocentric interference was comparable on both stick and switch trials is 
consistent with previous research that has shown automatic computation of the self perspective 
(e.g. Apperly, Back, Samson, & France, 2008; Keysar et al., 2000, 2003) and pervasive effects of 
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own knowledge (e.g. Birch & Bloom, 2007; Ferguson, Apperly, Ahmad, Bindemann, & Cane, 
2015; Ferguson & Breheny, 2012; Mitchell et al., 1996).  
It is interesting to find evidence that other perspective-taking is harder than self 
perspective-taking in the current task, even when a perspective-switch was not required. A 
previous attempt to load executive functions while participants computed level-1 visual 
perspectives found that self and other trials were equally affected by a secondary task (egocentric 
and altercentric intrusions increased to a similar extent; Qureshi et al., 2010). The authors take 
this as evidence that the executive load impacted the selection of the perspective necessary for 
that trial, after the self and other perspectives had been calculated in a relatively automatic 
manner. However, the absence of an altercentric effect in our behavioural data on stick trials 
means we have no grounds to believe that the other perspective was being calculated on these 
trials. This contrasts with previous reports that altercentric effects (due to the other perspective 
calculation) arise even when participants only have to judge self perspective and so are never 
required to switch perspectives (Samson et al., 2010, Experiment 3). One possibility is that 
participants in the present study did not calculate the other’s perspective on the second successive 
self trial, which would suggest that other perspective calculation was less automatic than has 
previously been claimed. Another possibility, consistent with the observations of Samson et al., is 
that the altercentric effect tends to be relatively small compared with the egocentric effect, and so 
was not detected on behavioural measures in the stick condition of the present experiment.  
Examining the location of participants’ eye movements around the visual scenes provided 
further explanation for these effects. Analyses of the location of the first fixation following image 
onset compared consistent trials, where discs were only visible on the wall in front of the avatar, 
with inconsistent trials, where discs were only visible on the wall behind the avatar. As was 
expected given the salient visual differences between these conditions (i.e. presence/absence of 
discs on one wall), participants were biased to fixate the gaze location when the participant and 
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avatar’s perspectives were consistent, but were biased to fixate the no-gaze location when the 
perspectives were inconsistent. More interesting, however, was the finding that participants 
showed an overall bias to first fixate the gaze location when taking the avatar’s perspective, but 
were equally likely to make their first fixation on the gaze and no-gaze location when responding 
according to their own perspective. Crucially, this effect of perspective reflected a reduced bias to 
first fixate the disc location (i.e. the gaze location on consistent trials and the no-gaze location on 
inconsistent trials) when referring to the other perspective than when referring to the self 
perspective. This pattern suggests that when taking the avatar’s perspective people are less 
influenced by the salient presence/absence of discs. The fact that the no-gaze bias on inconsistent 
trials was reduced when taking the avatar’s perspective merely supports the participants’ task 
demands in this condition- to follow the avatar’s gaze and verify the number of discs they see. 
However, the fact that the gaze location bias was also reduced when taking the avatar’s 
perspective on consistent trials (when both the avatar and participant saw the same thing) is 
indicative of a tight link between visual attention and confidence in one’s own interpretation of 
events. In addition, we found evidence of both egocentric and altercentric effects that were not 
modulated by trial type. When taking the avatar’s perspective, egocentric interference was visible 
on inconsistent trials as a significant bias to first fixate the disc location (M = -.14), even though 
this location was in conflict with the avatar’s visual perspective. When taking the self 
perspective, participants showed a stronger bias to first fixate discs when their location was 
reinforced by the avatar’s gaze direction (i.e. the gaze location on self-consistent trials, M = .66) 
compared to when the discs’ location was in conflict with the avatar’s gaze direction (i.e. the no-
gaze location on self-inconsistent trials, M = -.59). This finding supports the assertion that the 
avatar’s visual perspective elicited altercentric interference on self trials, and demonstrates that 
participants did experience altercentric interference on self-stick trials even though this was not 
large enough to be manifest in behavioural responses.  
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In order to understand the effects of perspective and switching in the absence of low-level 
cues that might guide visual attention, we ran further analyses on inconsistent trials where discs 
were visible on both walls, meaning that inherent visual biases (i.e. the mere presence/absence of 
discs) to one wall or the other were eliminated. When stimuli were equated, we found that 
participants were still more likely to first fixate the wall holding the avatar’s gaze when cued to 
take the avatar’s perspective compared to when referring to the self perspective (where they 
divided their attention equally between the gaze location and the location behind the avatar’s 
view). This shows that participants were rapidly able to direct visual attention to appropriate 
locations in the scene according to the perspective cue, and not simply directional properties of 
the avatar. Biases to the avatar’s gaze location were also eliminated when a perspective switch 
was required between trials, but not when sticking with the same perspective over consecutive 
trials. This suggests that switching perspectives between trials prompts participants to maintain a 
more global viewing strategy, thus facilitating self-perspective judgments. Finally, eye-tracking 
analysis of these visually balanced stimuli supports a weak altercentric effect on self stick trials, 
with a bias to first fixate the avatar’s gaze location on inconsistent trials, though no bias was 
evident on self switch inconsistent trials. Taken together, these eye-tracking results show that the 
gaze location bias is highest in conditions that show egocentrism (i.e. the ‘other’ trials), and 
lowest of all in the self-switch condition that shows altercentrism. Considered alongside the clear 
effects of perspective seen in the 1-sided consistent/inconsistent trials, this pattern therefore 
provides further evidence against the suggestion that the avatar task (and the altercentric effect in 
particular) is purely driven by spatial cueing of attention (e.g. Heyes, 2014; Santiesteban et al., 
2014). Directional accounts assert that responses on inconsistent trials are delayed because 
directional, not agentive, features of the avatar (i.e. forehead, eyes, nose, etc) automatically shift 
attention to the discs on one side of the screen, causing a conflict with the total number of discs 
on the screen. We specifically examined the location of the first fixation participants made in our 
task since this should provide an indirect measure of automatic processing (but see Duc, Bays, & 
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Husain, 2008; Deubel & Schneider, 1996; Hoffman & Subramaniam, 1995). Therefore, the fact 
that our participants’ first fixations showed different biases when cued to adopt the self or other 
perspective, specifically dividing their attention between the two sides on self trials, supports the 
mentalising explanation. It also fits with recent evidence showing attenuated altercentrism when 
the avatar’s view is blocked by opaque goggles (Furlanetto et al., 2016, but see Cole, Atkinson, 
Le, & Smith, 2016), reduced altercentric effects for non-social versus social agents (Nielsen et 
al., 2015; Schurz et al., 2015), and correlations between social skills and altercentric intrusions 
(Nielsen et al., 2015). 
In summary, we have shown that while altercentric interference from the avatar’s 
perspective can be reduced or eliminated when participants stick with their own perspective 
across consecutive trials, egocentric effects are more pervasive and are not modulated by 
perspective switching. This behavioural effect was complemented by eye-tracking measures that 
revealed distinct fixation patterns for self and other perspective-taking. Participants showed a 
stronger bias to the avatar’s gaze location when adopting the avatar’s perspective, but divided 
their attention between both possible locations (i.e. the gaze and no-gaze locations) when 
referring to their own perspective. This finding goes against recent accounts that have attributed 
inconsistency effects in this task to directional, not agentive, cues from the avatar that 
automatically orient attention to one side of the screen.  
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